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Intelligible Worlds
Abstract: The paradigmatic mereological relation is the relation of spatial part.
Already much less paradigmatic is the relation of temporal part. The realm of
abstract entities seems to be the ontological region where the notion of part and
whole has no application at all. In what follows, I will contend that this is not
true. There are part-whole relationships between abstract entities, and indeed
relationships that are systematic to the point of constitutingmereologically struc-
tured universes of abstract entities, “intelligible worlds”, as I will call them (in
translation of the Latin “mundi intelligibiles”). The part-whole relations between
abstract entities differ significantly from those between spatial, or temporal, or
spatio-temporal entities. However, there are also significant analogies between
abstract and concrete part-whole relations.
1 Preliminaries
The paradigmatic mereological relation is the relation of spatial part. Already
much less paradigmatic is the relation of temporal part. The realm of abstract
entities seems to be the ontological regionwhere the notion of part andwhole has
no application at all. In what follows, I will contend that this is not true. There are
part-whole relationships between abstract entities, and indeed relationships that
are systematic to the point of constituting mereologically structured universes of
abstract entities, “intelligible worlds”, as I will call them (in translation of the
Latin “mundi intelligibiles”). The part-whole relations between abstract entities
differ significantly from those between spatial, or temporal, or spatio-temporal
entities. However, there are also significant analogies between abstract and
concrete part-whole relations, as we shall see.
The basic mereological language is a language of first-order predicate logic
in which “(xPy)” and “(x = y)” (and all the variants of these two expressions
that can be produced by employing all manners of replacing “x” and “y” in them
by “x”, “y”, “z”, “u”, “v”, “w”, “x󸀠”, “y󸀠”, etc.) are the only basic predicates.
The basic logical constants are ¬ (negation), → (material implication), ∀ (the
all-quantifier) and ι (the operator of definite description). As is well known,
this basis is sufficient for defining all truth-functional connectives, and in the
first place ∧, ∨, and ↔, in other words: conjunction, non-exclusive disjunction,
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and material equivalence. In order to save brackets, it is stipulated that binding
strength decreases from left to right in the following series: ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔. And
note that the embracing brackets in the basic predicates (and in the sentences
formed from them by saturation with terms) will be omitted, unless the predi-
cate – or a one-place predicate resulting from it by substitution of a term for a
variable – constitutes the range of a quantifier, or the range of the operator of
definite description (or of another term-forming operator), or the range of the
negation-operator (¬). Further bracket-saving measures, here implemented, are
the following: Outer brackets – that is, such as occur if the expression enclosed
by them is not within another expression – will always be omitted. Brackets
within ∧-chains and ∨-chains will always be omitted. As far as brackets are
concerned, the defined predicate ̸= (x ̸= y := ¬(x = y)) is treated just like the basic
predicate =.
The indicated basis also suffices to define all at-most-N quantifiers and
all at-least-N quantifiers, and therefore also all precisely-N quantifiers (where
N stands for any Arabic numeral designating a natural number). The most
prominent at-least-N quantifier is the at-least-1 quantifier, or in other words,∃, which is defined as follows: ∃xA[x] := ¬∀¬A[x]. The most prominent pre-
cisely-N quantifier is the precisely-1 quantifier, ∃=1, which is defined as follows:∃=1xA[x] := ∃x(A[x]∧∀y(A[y]→ y = x)).1
The logic employed is classical first-order logic with identity and definite
descriptions. I will not bother to write down this logic, since it is well known.
What deserves some attention, however, is the treatment here accorded to definite
descriptions. The two relevant axiom-schemata are these: ∃=1xA[x]→ A[ιxA[x]]
and ¬∃=1xA[x] → ιxA[x] = ιy(y ̸= y). Thus, a definite description ιxA[x] whose
condition of normalcy ∃=1xA[x] is not fulfilled designates the same object as is
designated by “ιy(y ̸= y)”; this object is some arbitrarily chosen object in the
universe of discourse.
To the extent deductions and proofs are presented in what follows, these
deductions and proofs are going to be informal (for the sake of readability). But,
of course, they can be transposed into the strict or formal mode – if one is ready
to undergo the trouble.
1 The variables “x” and “y” are used in this definition in a merely representative fashion.
Other contexts will require the use of other variables. It does not matter which variables are
employed as long as syntactic well-formedness and the structure required by the definitions is
preserved. These observations apply to all definitions and also to all axioms and theorems that
follow.
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2 A mereology for abstract entities
First of all, here are two definitions of mereological predicates, and one definition
of a mereological operator (all three defined expressions will be needed right
away):
D1: xP∗y := xPy ∧¬∀u(xPu)2
D2: EL(z) := ∀x(xP∗z→ x = z)
D3: σyA[y] := ιu(∀y(A[y]→ yPu)∧∀x(∀y(A[y]→ yPx)→ uPx))
D1 defines what is meant by “x is a non-trivial part of y”; it is this: x is a part of y
without being a part of everything (in the universe of discourse). D2 defines what
is meant by “z is an elementary whole”; it is this: every non-trivial part of z is
z. Note that D2 is not quite the definition of “AT(z)” (or: “z is an atom”); for the
definition of this latter predicate is this:
D4: AT(z) := ∀x(xPz→ x = z)
In other words, an atom is something that has no proper parts (since ¬∃x(xPz ∧¬(x = z)) is logically equivalent to∀x(xPz→ x = z). It is trivially provable that every
atom is an elementary whole; the converse, however, is not provable.
D3, finally, defines what is meant by “the sum of all y such that A[y]”; it is
this: the mereologically smallest entity (in the universe of discourse) that comprises
all entities (in the universe of discourse) that satisfy A[y]. The principles A4
and A3 below guarantee for every predicate A[y] (expressible in the language)
that the condition of unique fulfilment is satisfied for the following predicate
corresponding to A[y]: ∀y(A[y] → yPu) ∧ ∀x(∀y(A[y] → yPx) → uPx). Thus,
σyA[y] always refers to what, judging by its meaning (or sense), it is supposed
to refer to.
Consider, then, the following series of axioms and axiom-schemata:
A1: ∀x∀y∀z(xPy ∧ yPz→ xPz)
A2: ∀x(xPx)
A3: ∀x∀y(xPy ∧ yPx→ x = y)
A4: ∃u(∀y(A[y]→ yPu)∧∀x(∀y(A[y]→ yPx)→ uPx))
A5: ∀x∀y(∀z(EL(z)∧ zPx→ zPy)→ xPy)
A6: ∀x(xP∗σuA[u]→∃z(zP∗x ∧∃y(A[y]∧ zP∗y)))
2 Regarding embracing brackets, “(xP∗y)” acts just like “(xPy)”.
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The natural interpretation of this axiomatic theory is that it (truthfully) describes
some intelligible world (in the sense introduced in section 1).3 In fact, there are
several candidates for what it naturally describes, as we shall see. But what is it
that makes it appropriate to say that this mereology, A1–A6, is naturally about
abstract entities? It is simply the fact that it is not natural to view it as amereology
for concrete entities. There are some features of it which make interpreting it
as a mereology for concrete entities unnatural – indeed, which make such an
interpretation unfeasible for paradigmatic concrete totalities, like real space and
real time. This is already the case if one takes the mereology as it is, but it is most
dramatically apparent if one adds existence assumptions that lift A1–A6 above
the level of trivial satisfiability.
Consider σu(u ̸= u), in other words: ιu(∀y(y ̸= y → yPu) ∧ ∀x(∀y(y ̸= y →
yPx)→ uPx)). On the basis of A4 and A3, it is easy to prove
T1: ∀x(σu(u ̸= u)Px)
and its corollary
T2: ∃y∀x(yPx)
Obviously, it is not a natural mereological feature of concrete entities that there
is an entity among them which is a part of all of them. If we look at real space,
there is no spatial whole which is a spatial part of every spatial whole, and if we
look at real time, there is no temporal whole which is a temporal part of every
temporalwhole. ThusT2 (and therefore the conjunction of the principles ofwhich
T2 is a logical consequence) is not true of spatial wholes, and not true of temporal
wholes. In fact, even if space-points were counted as spatial wholes and there
were only two space-points, there would be no spatial whole that is a part of every
spatial whole; and even if time-points were counted as temporal wholes and there
were only two time-points, therewouldbeno temporalwhole that is a part of every
temporal whole.
Consider next elementary wholes, as defined by D2. If (using D1) we unpack
the definiens of EL(z) – ∀x(xP∗z→ x = z) – and bring the result into a different but
logically equivalent form, we obtain:
T3: ∀z(EL(z)↔∀x(xPz ∧ x ̸= z→∀u(xPu)))
3 What is (truthfully) described by a theory is called a “model” for it. A model for a theory can
be artificially concocted, made up by applying ad hoc procedures and constructions; it can be
specially sought out – or it can be simply natural.
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T3 (a consequence of mere logic and definitions) says that the elementary wholes
are precisely the entities all of whose proper parts are parts of every entity. This
entails that each elementary whole that is different from σu(u ̸= u) has σu(u ̸= u)
as its one and only proper part. How does this follow? Consider that it is precisely
what is stated by T6 below. But, first of all, we have T4:
T4: ∀x󸀠(∀u󸀠(x󸀠Pu󸀠)↔ x󸀠 = σu(u ̸= u))
Proof. (I) Suppose x󸀠 = σu(u ̸= u); hence by T1: ∀u󸀠(x󸀠Pu󸀠). Suppose ∀u󸀠(x󸀠Pu󸀠);
by T1: ∀x(σu(u ̸= u)Px); hence x󸀠Pσu(u ̸= u) ∧ σu(u ̸= u)Px󸀠; hence by A3: x󸀠 =
σu(u ̸= u). qed
From T3 and T4 we get:
T5: ∀z(EL(z)↔∀x(xPz ∧ x ̸= z→ x = σu(u ̸= u)))
And therefore:
T6: ∀z(EL(z) ∧ z ̸= σu(u ̸= u)→ σu(u ̸= u)Pz ∧ σu(u ̸= u) ̸= z ∧ ∀x(xPz ∧ x ̸= z→
x = σu(u ̸= u)))
Proof. Suppose EL(z)∧ z ̸= σu(u ̸= u); hence according to T1 (and the symmetry of
non-identity): (i) σu(u ̸= u)Pz∧σu(u ̸= u) ̸= z; and according toT5: (ii) ∀x(xPz∧x ̸=
z→ x = σu(u ̸= u)). qed
Now, evidently, neither spatial nor temporal wholes are entities that have exactly
one proper part. Perhaps some of them have no proper parts, but certainly none
of them have exactly one proper part. In fact, it is one of the most widespread
mereological intuitions that if any entity y has a proper part x – and certainly
there are such entities – that then it must also have at least one other proper
part, namely, the complement of x relative to y; moreover, the complementing
proper part of y is intuited to have no part in common with the complemented
proper part of y. As convincing as this may sound (or rather look: one sees it
“in the mind’s eye”), it is nonetheless only true of concrete entities and concrete
part-whole relations: For some intelligible worlds, not only T6 is true but also∃z(EL(z) ∧ z ̸= σu(u ̸= u)) (as we shall see); the logical consequence of this is
that, for such worlds, ∃z∃=1x(xPz ∧ x ̸= z) is also true – squarely contradicting
thewidespreadmereological intuition.Moreover, if one followsA1–A6, then there
simply are no complements as intended by the above-mentioned widespread
intuition; because everything (in the universe of discourse) has a part in common
with everything, due to T1.
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And there is yet more food for wonder here. For some intelligible worlds,∃≥2z(EL(z)∧ z ̸= σu(u ̸= u)) is true (as we shall see); it follows on the basis of T6
that there are two elementary wholes, both different from σu(u ̸= u), which both
have σu(u ̸= u) as their sole proper part. How can this be? What distinguishes the
two if they are identical with respect to proper parts? That there is something that
distinguishes them is inconceivable for concrete entities; but for abstract entities
it is quite a different matter (as we shall see).
Finally, if onehears ofatoms, the immediate association is that there aremany
of them and that other entities – in fact, all other entities of a given kind – are
composed of them, in such amanner that the sets of atoms that go into composing
those other entities are different if the entities themselves are different. This is the
intuitive view of atoms, which treats atoms as concrete entities. But on the basis
of the above principles it turns out that there is only one atom, σu(u ̸= u):
T7: AT(σu(u ̸= u))∧∀z(AT(z)→ z = σu(u ̸= u))
Proof. (I) Suppose xPσu(u ̸= u); by T1: σu(u ̸= u)Px; hence by A3: x = σu(u ̸= u).
Therefore: ∀x(xPσu(u ̸= u) → x = σu(u ̸= u)); hence by D4: AT(σu(u ̸= u)). (II)
Suppose AT(z); by T1: σu(u ̸= u)Pz; hence by supposition andD4: σu(u ̸= u) = z,
hence z = σu(u ̸= u). Therefore: ∀z(AT(z)→ z = σu(u ̸= u)). qed
Since there is only oneatom (in theuniverse of discourse), nothing (in theuniverse
of discourse) can be composed of atoms (plural). And if one allowed (departing
fromcommonusage, but not unacceptably) that somethingmay also be composed
of just one atom, then it is – according to A1–A6, and assuming ∃≥2z(EL(z) ∧ z ̸=
σu(u ̸= u)) – still not true that different entities which are composed of one atom
are each composed of a different atom: the various elementary wholes that differ
from σu(u ̸= u) are all composed of one atom, but it is always the same atom,
σu(u ̸= u), as we have already seen (consider the consequences of T6).
InA1–A6, the role of atoms is transferred to the elementary wholes. Not for the
predicate AT(z), but for the predicate EL(z), it is provable.
T8: ∀x(x = σz(EL(z)∧ zPx))
Proof. (I) It is an easy consequence of A4, A3, and D3: ∀u(EL(u) ∧ uPx →
uPσz(EL(z) ∧ zPx)); hence by A5: xPσz(EL(z) ∧ zPx). (II) Suppose EL(u) ∧
uPσz(EL(z) ∧ zPx)); if ∀x󸀠(uPx󸀠), then uPx; if, on the other hand, ¬∀x󸀠(uPx󸀠),
then uP∗σz(EL(z)∧ zPx)) according to D1, and consequently by A6: ∃z󸀠(z󸀠P∗u ∧∃y(EL(y) ∧ yPx ∧ z󸀠P∗y)); hence by logical transformations and by making use
of the assumption EL(u): ∃z󸀠∃y(EL(u) ∧ EL(y) ∧ z󸀠P∗u ∧ z󸀠P∗y ∧ yPx); hence by
D2: ∃z󸀠∃y(EL(u) ∧ EL(y) ∧ z󸀠 = u ∧ z󸀠 = y ∧ yPx); hence uPx. It has now been
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proven: ∀u(EL(u)∧ uPσz(EL(z)∧ zPx)→ uPx); hence by A5: σz(EL(z)∧ zPx)Px.
By combining (I) and (II), it follows on the basis of A3: x = σz(EL(z)∧ zPx). qed
T9: ∀x∀y(x ̸= y→∃z(EL(z)∧ zPx ∧¬(zPy))∨∃z(EL(z)∧ zPy ∧¬(zPx)))
Proof. Proof: Suppose x ̸= y; hence by A3: ¬(xPy)∨¬(yPx). If the first alternative
of this disjunction is true, then by A5: ∃z(EL(z) ∧ zPx ∧ ¬(zPy)); if the second
alternative is true, then again by A5: ∃z(EL(z) ∧ zPy ∧ ¬(zPx)); hence in either
case: ∃z(EL(z)∧ zPx ∧¬(zPy))∨∃z(EL(z)∧ zPy ∧¬(zPx)). qed
Thus, every entity (in the universe of discourse) is the sum of its elementary
parts (i.e., the sum of the elementary wholes that are parts of it), and if entities
(in the universe of discourse) differ, then they differ with respect to at least one
elementary part.
3 Complement, foundation, and top
If x is the sum of all elementary wholes that are parts of x, what is the sum of all
elementary wholes that are not parts of x? – This latter sum is the complement
of x:
D5: com(x) := σz(EL(z)∧¬zPx)
We have so far been looking at the foundations of intelligible worlds structurally
defined by A1–A6; we now take a look at their tops. The tops are opposite to the
foundations, or in other words: the tops are the complements of the foundations
(and vice versa). To put it in an exact manner: the entities in a given top (of
an intelligible world structurally defined by A1–A6), that is, the comprehensive
wholes (among them σu(u = u)), are precisely the complements of the entities in
the foundation: they are the complements of the elementarywholes (among these
σu(u ̸= u)).
The following definitions are the counterparts of D1, D2, and D4:
cD1: xPoy := xPy ∧¬∀u(uPy)
cD2: CO(z) := ∀x(zPox→ x = z)
cD4: TO(z) := ∀x(zPx→ x = z)
cD1 defines what is means for x to be a distinguished part of y: x is a part of y
without everything (in the universe of discourse) being a part of y; cD2 defines
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what it means for z to be a comprehensive whole: every entity (in the universe of
discourse) of which z is a distinguished part is identical to z; cD4 defines what it
means for z to be a totality: every entity (in the universe of discourse) of which z is
a part is identical to z. The following theorems, then, are the counterparts of the
theorems T1–T9:
cT1: ∀x(xPσu(u = u))
cT2: ∃y∀x(xPy)
cT3: ∀z(CO(z)↔∀x(zPx ∧ x ̸= z→∀u(uPx)))
cT4: ∀x󸀠(∀u󸀠(u󸀠Px󸀠)↔ x󸀠 = σu(u = u))
cT5: ∀z(CO(z)↔∀x(zPx ∧ x ̸= z→ x = σu(u = u)))
cT6: ∀z(CO(z)∧ z ̸= σu(u = u)→ zPσu(u = u)∧ σu(u = u) ̸= z ∧∀x(zPx ∧ x ̸= z→
x = σu(u = u)))
cT7: TO(σu(u = u))∧∀z(TO(z)→ z = σu(u = u))
cT8: ∀x(x = σz∀y(CO(y)∧ xPy→ zPy))
cT9: ∀x∀y(x ̸= y→∃z(CO(z)∧ xPz ∧¬(yPz))∨∃z(CO(z)∧ yPz ∧¬(xPz)))
The proofs of cT1–cT9 (which I shall not present here) are somewhat harder to
achieve than the proofs of T1–T9, since the principles A1–A6 have an orientation
towards the foundations of the intelligible worlds structurally defined by them,
not towards their tops. In proving cT1–cT9, it is helpful to avail oneself of the
following six theorems, which, taken together, establish a match between tops
and foundations:
T10: ∀x(EL(x)∧¬∀u(xPu)→ (xPσz(EL(z)∧ B[z])↔ B[x]))
Proof. Assume EL(x)∧¬∀u(xPu). (I) Suppose B[x]; hence by the assumption, A4,
A3,D3: xPσz(EL(z)∧B[z]). (II) Suppose xPσz(EL(z)∧B[z]); hence by the assump-
tion and D1: xP∗σz(EL(z) ∧ B[z]); hence by A6: ∃z󸀠(z󸀠P∗x ∧ ∃y(EL(y) ∧ B[y] ∧
z󸀠P∗y)); hence by logical transformations and the assumption: ∃z󸀠∃y(EL(x) ∧
EL(y)∧ z󸀠P∗x∧ z󸀠P∗y∧B[y]); hence byD2: ∃z󸀠∃y(EL(x)∧EL(y)∧ z󸀠 = x∧ z󸀠 = y∧
B[y]); hence B[x]. qed
T11: ∀x(com(com(x)) = x)
Proof. (I) Suppose EL(u)∧uPcom(com(x)). If∀u󸀠(uPu󸀠), then uPx. If¬∀u󸀠(uPu󸀠),
then according toT10: uPσz(EL(z)∧¬(zPcom(x)))↔¬(uPcom(x)), and therefore
because of uPcom(com(x)) andD5: ¬(uPcom(x)); and then once more according
to T10: uPσz󸀠(EL(z󸀠)∧¬(z󸀠Px))↔¬(uPx), and therefore because of ¬(uPcom(x))
and D5: uPx. (II) Suppose EL(u) ∧ uPx. If ∀u󸀠(uPu󸀠), then uPcom(com(x)). If
Intelligible Worlds | 297
¬∀u󸀠(uPu󸀠), then according to T10 (as we have just seen): uPcom(com(x)) ↔¬(uPcom(x))↔ uPx, and therefore because of uPx: uPcom(com(x)). On the basis
of (I) and A5, we have: com(com(x))Px; on the basis of (II) and A5, we have:
xPcom(com(x)); on the basis of A3, we therefore obtain: com(com(x)) = x. qed
T12: ∀x∀y(xPy↔ com(y)Pcom(x))
Proof. (I) Assume xPy; suppose EL(z󸀠)∧ z󸀠Pcom(y); if ∀u(z󸀠Pu), then z󸀠Pcom(x);
if ¬∀u(z󸀠Pu), then by T10 and D5 from z󸀠Pcom(y): ¬(z󸀠Py); hence by A1 and
the assumption: ¬(z󸀠Px), hence by A4, A3, D3: z󸀠Pσz(EL(z) ∧¬(z󸀠Px)), hence by
D5: z󸀠Pcom(x). We have now established: ∀z󸀠(EL(z󸀠)∧ z󸀠Pcom(y)→ z󸀠Pcom(x));
hence by A5: com(y)Pcom(x). (II) Assume com(y)Pcom(x); hence on the ba-
sis of what has already been established in (I) [the left-to-right part of T12]:
com(com(x))Pcom(com(y)); hence on the basis of T11: xPy. qed
T13: ∀z(CO(z)↔ EL(com(z)), ∀z(CO(com(z))↔ EL(z)))
Proof. (I) Assume CO(z), hence by cD2 and cD1: ∀x(zPx ∧ ¬∀u󸀠(u󸀠Px) →
x = z). Suppose x󸀠Pcom(z) ∧ ¬∀u󸀠(x󸀠Pu󸀠); hence by T12 and T11: zPcom(x󸀠) ∧¬∀u󸀠(com(u󸀠)Pcom(x󸀠)); hence ¬∀u󸀠(u󸀠Pcom(x󸀠)) [for if ∀u󸀠(u󸀠Pcom(x󸀠)) were
true, then certainly also ∀u󸀠(com(u󸀠)Pcom(x󸀠))would be true]. Therefore, on the
basis of the assumption, we have: com(x󸀠) = z, hence: com(com(x󸀠)) = com(z),
hence by T11: x󸀠 = com(z). We have now seen: ∀x󸀠(x󸀠Pcom(z) ∧ ¬∀u󸀠(x󸀠Pu󸀠) →
x󸀠 = com(z)), hence by D1 and D2: EL(com(z)). (II) Assume EL(com(z)),
hence by D2 and D1: ∀x(xPcom(z) ∧ ¬∀u󸀠(xPu󸀠) → x = com(z)). Suppose
zPx󸀠 ∧ ¬∀u󸀠(u󸀠Px󸀠); hence by T12: com(x󸀠)Pcom(z) ∧ ¬∀u󸀠(com(x󸀠)Pcom(u󸀠));
hence ¬∀u󸀠(com(x󸀠)Pu󸀠) [for if ∀u󸀠(com(x󸀠)Pu󸀠) were true, then certainly also∀u󸀠(com(x󸀠)Pcom(u󸀠))would be true]. Therefore, on the basis of the assumption,
we have: com(x󸀠) = com(z), hence: com(com(x󸀠)) = com(com(z)), hence by T11:
x󸀠 = z.We have now seen: ∀x󸀠(zPx󸀠∧¬∀u󸀠(u󸀠Px󸀠)→ x󸀠 = z), hence by cD1 and cD2:
CO(z). The second part of T13 is an easy corollary of the first part, given T11. qed
T14: σu(u = u) = com(σu(u ̸= u))
Proof. (I) Because of cT1: com(σu(u ̸= u))Pσu(u = u). (II) Assume EL(z󸀠) ∧
z󸀠Pσu(u = u); if ∀u󸀠(z󸀠Pu󸀠), then z󸀠Pcom(σu(u ̸= u)); if ¬∀u󸀠(z󸀠Pu󸀠), then¬(z󸀠Pσu(u ̸= u)),4 and therefore: z󸀠Pσz(EL(z) ∧ ¬(zPσu(u ̸= u))), on the
4 If z󸀠Pσu(u ̸= u), then z󸀠 = σu(u ̸= u) (because of T7 and D4), and consequently ∀u󸀠(z󸀠Pu󸀠)
because of T1.
298 | UweMeixner
basis of A4, A3, D3; hence z󸀠Pcom(σu(u ̸= u)) because of D5. We have now
established: ∀z󸀠(EL(z󸀠) ∧ z󸀠Pσu(u = u) → z󸀠Pcom(σu(u ̸= u))); hence by A5:
σu(u = u)Pcom(σu(u ̸= u)). Given (I) and (II), T14 follows by A3. qed
T15: ∀x(CO(x)↔∃y(EL(y)∧ x = com(y))),∀x(EL(x)↔∃y(CO(y)∧ x = com(y)))
Proof. (I) Assume CO(x); hence by T13: EL(com(x)); hence by T11: EL(com(x))∧
x = com(com(x)); hence ∃y(EL(y) ∧ x = com(y)). (II) Assume ∃y(EL(y) ∧ x =
com(y)); by T13: ∃y(EL(y) ∧ CO(com(y)) ∧ x = com(y)); hence CO(x). The proof
of the second part of T15 is entirely analogous. qed
4 Models for A1–A6
When we look at the contents of the theorems cT1–cT9, it turns out that
part-whole-relations between certain concrete entities are to some extent as
blatantly out of accord with what those theorems are implying as they are out of
accord with what T1–T9 are implying. For example, one will not find a spatial
whole (that is, a part of real space) that differs from the spatial totality (that is,
from real space) in such amanner that it is a proper part only of the spatial totality;
at least this is true if one does not count space-points as spatial wholes.5 And
one will not find a temporal whole (that is, a part of real time) that differs from
the temporal totality (real time) in such a manner that it is a proper part only
of the temporal totality. It is true that A1–A6 do not entail that there is a whole
that differs from the totality in such a manner that it is a proper part only of
the totality. But the mere extra assumption ∃z(CO(z) ∧ z ̸= σu(u = u)) (“There
is at least one comprehensive whole that differs from the totality”) will yield∃z(zPσu(u = u) ∧ σu(u = u) ̸= z ∧ ∀x(zPx ∧ x ̸= z → x = σu(u = u))) on the basis
of cT6.
It is, however, not without good reason that I put an emphasis on the phrase
“to some extent” in the first sentence of this section (section 4). There are concrete
totalities (each unique in the relevant model) which are such that some of their
proper parts are proper parts only of them (in the relevant model). Consider a
group G, consisting of four people; let G be the totality. Clearly, G is a concrete,
non-abstract entity, and so are all of its subgroups (whether or not the members
of G – the four people themselves – are counted as subgroups of G, that is, as
5 If one does count space-points as spatial wholes, then one can say that real space without a
certain (arbitrary) space-point is a spatial whole of the envisaged kind.
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singleton subgroups of G). It is evident that each of the four three-membered
subgroups of G differs from G in such a manner that it is a proper part (proper
subgroup) only of G. Moreover, it is easily seen that, if the universe of discourse
encompasses G and all of its subgroups (of people) and nothing else, then all the
theorems in cT1–cT9 turn out to be true – given that “xPy” and “σu(u = u)” are
understood in the straightforward sense that the stipulated universe of discourse
suggests.6
Readers may wonder whether the mereological model for cT1–cT9 that has
G for its totality – in short: the G-model – satisfies not only cT1–cT9 but also
T1–T9, because it simply satisfies A1–A6. If that were true, then there would be
a concrete and rather natural model for a mereology that – at first – looked as if
it was naturally appropriate only for intelligible worlds. To decide the matter, one
has to be clear on the question of which entities, precisely, are in the stipulated
universe of discourse. It comprises at least G, the four three-membered subgroups
of G, and the six two-membered subgroups of G. Does it comprise anything else?
Since the stipulated universe of discourse comprises G and all subgroups of G and
nothing else, further candidates for being in the universe of discourse can only
be one-membered and zero-membered subgroups of G (consisting of members
of G: certain people). But an empty subgroup of G – a group which would be a
subgroup of every subgroup of G – is out of the question, and singleton subgroups
of G – each to be identified with one of the four members of G – are groups
only by courtesy. In the strict acceptation of the word “group”, there is nothing
else in the universe of discourse than the already mentioned eleven entities; in a
liberal acceptation of “group”, four singleton subgroups of G are in the universe
of discourse in addition to the eleven entities already mentioned.
Let us adopt the liberal position. The effect of this is that A1–A3, A5 and A6
turn out to be true; butA4, as it stands, cannot be true for the G-model; onlyA4󸀠 is
true for it:∃yA[y]→∃u(∀y(A[y]→ yPu)∧∀x(∀y(A[y]→ yPx)→ uPx)).7 Therefore,
6 G is the group which consists of Andrew, Anna, Nina, and Vladimir. The group which consists
of Anna and Nina is a proper part of G, and so is the group which consists of Anna and Andrew.
The (intended mereological) sum of these two proper parts of G is the group which consists of
Anna, Nina, and Andrew, which group, too, is a proper part of G. The sum of all (self-identical)
entities in the universe of discourse is certainly G. (According to the strict view, the number of
those entities is 11; according to the liberal view, their number is 15.)
7 Thus, in the axiom-system whose models are the models that are just like the G-model, only
A4 needs to be replaced (by A4󸀠), whereas A1–A3, A5 and A6 can be retained. However, certain
simplifications are recommendable: In A5, “EL(z)” should be replaced by “AT(z)”, and in A6,
“P∗” should be replaced by “P”. These simplifications are possible in view of D1, D2, and D4,
and the fact that for the models that are just like the G-model (they contain at least one proper
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the G-model is after all not a concrete naturalmodel forA1–A6. But there certainly
are abstract natural models forA1–A6. An entirely commonplace natural abstract
model forA1–A6 is obtained by stipulating that the universe of discourse is to
contain all the subsets of a certain set S, andnothing else (it does notmatterwhich
set S is, it may even be the empty set), and by interpreting “xPy” as “x is a subset
of y”. Then the elementary wholes (the entities that satisfy “EL(x)”) turn out to
be the singleton subsets of S plus the empty set; and the comprehensive wholes
(the entities that satisfy “CO(x)”) turn out to be S plus the subsets of S that differ
from S only by lacking precisely one element of S (“element” being taken in the
set-theoretical sense).
The abstract natural models for A1–A6 become more interesting if one adds
an axiom-schema of infinity to A1–A6, for example in the following way:
A7: ∃≥1z(EL(z)∧¬AT(z))∧ (∃≥Nz(EL(z)∧¬AT(z))→∃≥N+1z(EL(z)∧¬AT(z)))
Instead of ∃≥1z(EL(z) ∧ ¬AT(z)) ∧ (∃≥Nz(EL(z) ∧ ¬AT(z)) → ∃≥N+1z(EL(z) ∧¬AT(z))), one can just as well choose ∃≥1z(CO(z) ∧ ¬TO(z)) ∧ (∃≥Nz(CO(z) ∧¬TO(z))→∃≥N+1z(CO(z)∧¬TO(z))) as axiom-schema of infinity. For on the basis
of A1–A6, the former schema and the latter are deductively equivalent: whichever
of the two schemata one chooses as the one which is to be axiomatic, one will be
able to obtain the other one as a theorem.
Let the universe of discourse comprise, then, all the subsets of the set of
natural numbers and nothing else, with “xPy” being interpreted as “x is a subset
of y”. This stipulation, obviously, provides us with an abstract natural model
for A1–A6 plus A7. The most interesting natural abstract models for A1–A6 plus
A7 are, however, the following two: (I) Let the universe of discourse comprise
all states of affairs and nothing else, with “xPy” being interpreted as “x is
intensionally contained in y” (for example, the state of affairs that Peter is born
earlier than John is intensionally contained in the state of affairs that John is
born later than Peter, and the state of affairs that Peter has a date of birth is
intensionally contained in the state of affairs that Peter is born earlier than
John. (II) Let the universe of discourse comprise all properties of individuals and
nothing else, with “xPy” being interpreted as “x is intensionally contained in
y” (for example, the property of having a colour is intensionally contained in
the property of being red, and the property of being extended is intensionally
contained in the property of having a colour). If one accepts the world of states
– that is, at least two-membered – group and no empty group), ∀x¬∀u(xPu) is always true; this
fact makes xP∗y equivalent to xPy, and EL(z) equivalent to AT(z).
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of affairs and the world of properties of individuals (both aremundi intelligibiles)
as universes (of discourse) that conform to the descriptions provided by A1–A6
plusA7, then this presupposes that one has made, in both cases, twomomentous
decisions in addition to the, doubtless, momentous decision to accept states of
affairs and properties of individuals in huge numbers: one has decided to accept
that entities which intensionally contain each other (be they states of affairs or
properties of individuals) are identical to each other, that is, one has opted for
a “coarse-grained” individuation of states affairs and properties of individuals
(otherwise A3 would be violated); and one has decided to accept that, with each
state of affairs and each property of individuals, also its complement – or: its
negation, as one says if talk is about states of affairs or properties – is a state
of affairs, respectively, property of individuals. Each of these – in all – three
decisions has been severely disapproved of by this or that philosopher. Yet, if
one accepts abstract entities at all, and if one considers states of affairs and
properties to beabstract entities, then–within the ontological framework defined
by these two conditions (in fact, they point to yet further decisions) – all of the
metaphysical decisions mentioned seem perfectly all right.
WhatA1–A6plusA7mean for states of affairs and for properties of individuals
is explored in great detail (albeit in a somewhat different terminology) in my
books Axiomatic Formal Ontology and The Theory of Ontic Modalities. Here, I
would merely like to point out a few fascinating consequences which this formal
mereological theory has for states of affairs and properties of individuals (taken
to be abstract entities). Already in A1–A6 the following theorem is provable:
T16: ∀x(CO(x)∧¬TO(x)↔∀y(yPx↔¬(com(y)Px)))
T16 says that the comprehensive wholes which are not totalities – in other
words (in view of cT7), the comprehensive wholes which are different from
σu(u = u) – are precisely the mereologically maximal-consistent wholes, where
a mereologically maximal-consistent whole is defined as an entity such that
for each entity (in the universe of discourse) it is true that either that entity
itself or its complement (but not both) is a part of it. Given A7, the number of
comprehensive wholes which are not totalities – that is (by T16), the number
of maximal-consistent wholes – is infinite (since there are precisely as many
comprehensive wholes which are not totalities as there are elementary wholes
which are not atoms, as can be proven in A1–A6: T13, second part, T14, and T15,
first part, can be used as lemmas in the proof).
What are the maximal-consistent wholes if the entities in the universe of
discourse are precisely the states of affairs? They are the possible worlds, in
abstracto conceived of as maximal-consistent states of affairs (developing an
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idea that can be gathered from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus). And what are the
maximal-consistentwholes if the entities in theuniverse of discourse are precisely
the properties of individuals? In that case, they are the notiones completae
of Leibniz, conceived of as maximal-consistent properties of individuals, each
notio completa being the sum of all the properties a given individual has in a
given possible world. The metaphysically profound question is whether there
is an essential one-to-one match between individuals and notiones completae
(qua maximal-consistent properties of individuals), or not. This question has
two parts: (A) Does necessarily each notio completa have an individual as its
one and only exemplifier, such that, necessarily, different notiones have different
individuals as their sole exemplifiers, and such that necessarily there is for
each individual a notio completa which has it as its sole exemplifier? (B) May
a notio completa have a certain individual x as exemplifier without this being
necessarily so? If question (A) is answered by “yes” and question (B) by “no”,
then there is indeed an essential one-to-one match between individuals and
notiones completae, and one might as well identify the individuals (disregarding
concreteness) with the notiones completae: the maximal-consistent properties of
individuals. Among the interesting consequences of making this identification
would be, for example, (i) the exemplification of a property by an individual
– or in other words: the having of a property by an individual – turns into a
single-category mereological relation: xEXEMy := CO(x)∧¬TO(x)∧ yPx; and (ii)
the intuition that an actual individual x could have had other properties than it
really has canonly be accommodatedby saying thatwhat is really (literally)meant
by this is the following: a counterpart of x (a certainmaximal-consistent property)
has (comprises) other properties than x, but is not actual.8
5 The geography of A1-to-A6 worlds
For each intelligible world W which conforms to (the descriptions provided
by) A1–A6 the following is true: the number of entities in W is 2c(EL&¬AT),
where c(EL&¬AT) is the number of elementary wholes in W that are not atoms.
c(EL&¬AT) is taken from 0,1,2,3, ...;ℵ0. Each intelligible A1-to-A6 world with
1 ≤ c(EL&¬AT) has two distinct poles: a south pole: σu(u ̸= u), and a north pole:
σu(u = u), with σu(u ̸= u) ̸= σu(u = u). Each A1-to-A6 world with 2 ≤ c(EL&¬AT)
8 For more on the application of “actual” to properties of individuals and states of affairs, see
my books Meixner (1997) and Meixner (2006).
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has at least one latitudebetween the twopoles. If 3≤ c(EL&¬AT), then thenumber
of latitudes between the poles is ≥ 2 and the number of northern latitudes is equal
to the number of southern latitudes. If 2 ≤ c(EL&¬AT) and c(EL&¬AT) is an even
number, then there is an equator: a latitude which is neither a southern nor a
northern latitude, but the border between the southern and the northern half of
the world concerned. Each entity in an A1-to-A6world is either the south pole, or
the north pole, or is in one of the latitudes of the intelligible world. No entity in a
higher (more northern) latitude is ever part of an entity in a lower (more southern)
latitude. The south pole is the entity (in the world concerned) that consists of no
non-atomic elementarywholes (of theworld concerned). In thefirst latitudeabove
the south pole, there are the entities which consist of precisely one non-atomic
elementary whole; in the second latitude above the south pole, there are the
entities which consist of precisely two non-atomic elementary wholes; . . . ; in the
second latitude below the north pole, there are the entities which consist of all
but two non-atomic elementary wholes; in the first latitude below the north pole,
there are the entities which consist of all but one non-atomic elementary wholes.
The north pole is the entity which consists of all non-atomic elementary wholes.
The complement of the south pole is the north pole; the complement of an entity
in theNth latitude above the south pole is in theNth latitude below the north pole;
the complement of an entity in an equator is – in the equator.
Below, are the distribution schemata of entities inA1-to-A6worlds of the first
seven cardinalities. Each summand in the sum-expressions stands for the number
of entities to be found at the respective latitude or pole; the first summand (at the
left) refers to the south pole, the last summand (at the right) to the north pole,
the summands in between refer to the latitudes between the poles, one after the









Consider again the natural model for A1–A6 plus A7 which has precisely the
subsets of the set of natural numbers in the universe of discourse, with “xPy”
being interpreted as “x is a subset of y”. The world of this model has, besides
the two poles (the south pole is the empty set, the north pole the set of natural
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numbers), a denumerably infinite number of southern latitudes, each of them
occupied by a denumerably infinite number of finite sets (first singletons, then
pairs, then triples, then . . . ); and it has a denumberably infinite number of
northern latitudes, each of them occupied by a denumerably infinite number of
denumerably infinite sets; and it has an equator, occupiedbya superdenumerably
infinite number of denumerably infinite sets.
6 Other intelligible worlds
The system A1–A6 plus A7 is certainly sufficient for determining that natural
models of it are abstract, in other words, intelligible worlds. It is, however, not
the case that every infinite intelligible world can serve as a model of A1–A6 plus
A7. Obviously, neither the world of natural numbers nor the world of pure sets9
satisfies A1–A6 (though there are countless sub-regions of the world of pure sets
that satisfy A1–A6 and A7). Just for the sake of curiosity: Which axiomatic system
could serve as a mereology for the world of natural numbers (which world must
be carefully distinguished from the world of the sets of natural numbers)? For
obtaining such a mereology, the natural step is to interpret “xPy” as “x ≤ y”. This
immediately yields the principlesA1–A3, which, since the intended interpretation
is now very different from the interpretation originally intended, are re-named
into B1–B3:
B1: ∀x∀y∀z(xPy ∧ yPz→ xPz)
B2: ∀x(xPx)
B3: ∀x∀y(xPy ∧ yPx→ x = y)
The linearity of the world of natural numbers is captured in a mereological
way (given B1 and B3) by the following principle (which principle makes B2
superfluous: B2 is straightforwardly deducible from it):
B4: ∀x∀y(xPy ∨ yPx)
The infinity and the discreteness of the world of natural numbers (given B1, B3,
and B4) is captured in a mereological way by the following principle:
B5: ∀x∃z(xPz ∧ x ̸= z ∧¬∃z󸀠(xPz󸀠 ∧ x ̸= z󸀠 ∧ z󸀠Pz ∧ z󸀠 ̸= z))
9 Pure sets are the sets – conforming to a chosen axiomatic set theory – thatwould be still around
if there were nothing else but sets.
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On the basis of B5 and B4, it is provable:
T󸀠1: ∀x∃=1z(xPz ∧ x ̸= z ∧¬∃z󸀠(xPz󸀠 ∧ x ̸= z󸀠 ∧ z󸀠Pz ∧ z󸀠 ̸= z))
Proof. All that remains to be done in view of B5 is to demonstrate uniqueness.
Assume, therefore, for reductio: xPz ∧ x ̸= z ∧ ¬∃z󸀠(xPz󸀠 ∧ x ̸= z󸀠 ∧ z󸀠Pz ∧ z󸀠 ̸= z) ∧
xPu ∧ x ̸= u ∧¬∃z󸀠(xPz󸀠 ∧ x ̸= z󸀠 ∧ z󸀠Pu ∧ z󸀠 ̸= u)∧ u ̸= z. Because of B4: zPu ∨ uPz.
If zPu, then xPz ∧ x ̸= z ∧ zPu ∧ z ̸= u – contradicting ¬∃z󸀠(xPz󸀠 ∧ x ̸= z󸀠 ∧ z󸀠Pu ∧
z󸀠 ̸= u). If, on the other hand, uPz, then xPu ∧ x ̸= u ∧ uPz ∧ u ̸= z – contradicting¬∃z󸀠(xPz󸀠 ∧ x ̸= z󸀠 ∧ z󸀠Pz ∧ z󸀠 ̸= z). qed
D󸀠1: succ(x) := ιz(xPz ∧ x ̸= z ∧¬∃z󸀠(xPz󸀠 ∧ x ̸= z󸀠 ∧ z󸀠Pz ∧ z󸀠 ̸= z))
D󸀠1 defines the all-important successor-functor for natural numbers. The follow-
ing Peano-axiom is a theorem of the present system:
T󸀠2: ∀x∀y(succ(x) = succ(y)→ x = y)
Proof. Assume succ(x) = succ(y). By T󸀠1 and D󸀠1: xPsucc(x) ∧ x ̸= succ(x) ∧¬∃z󸀠(xPz󸀠 ∧ x ̸= z󸀠 ∧ z󸀠Psucc(x) ∧ z󸀠 ̸= succ(x)) and yPsucc(y) ∧ y ̸= succ(y) ∧¬∃z󸀠(yPz󸀠 ∧ y ̸= z󸀠 ∧ z󸀠Psucc(y)∧ z󸀠 ̸= succ(y)), hence by logical transformations:
(i) ∀z󸀠(xPz󸀠 ∧ z󸀠Psucc(x)∧ z󸀠 ̸= succ(x)→ x = z󸀠) and (ii) ∀z󸀠(yPz󸀠 ∧ z󸀠Psucc(y)∧
z󸀠 ̸= succ(y)→ y = z󸀠). Now, by B4: xPy ∨ yPx. In the first case, xPy ∧ yPsucc(x)
[since yPsucc(y) and succ(x) = succ(y)] ∧ y ̸= succ(x) [since y ̸= succ(y) and
succ(x) = succ(y)], and therefore on the basis of (i): x = y. In the second case,
yPx ∧ xPsucc(y) [since xPsucc(x) and succ(x) = succ(y)] ∧ x ̸= succ(y) [since
x ̸= succ(x) and succ(x) = succ(y)], and therefore on the basis of (ii): y = x, hence
x = y. qed
Consider next the following two axiom-schemata (which are immediately evident
in view of the intended interpretation):
B6a: ∃zA[z]→∃u(A[u]∧∀z(A[z]→ uPz))
B6b: ∃=NzA[z]→∃u(A[u]∧∀z(A[z]→ zPu))
(where “N” stands for any Arabic numeral except “0”)10
10 The mere use of Arabic numerals (as in ∃=1zA[z], ∃=2zA[z], ∃=3zA[z], ...) does not mean
that one is using or presupposing arithmetic: ∃=NzA[z] is definable entirely without the use of
arithmetic.
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Using B3, it is easy to deduce the following theorems from B6a and B6b:
T󸀠3a: ∃zA[z]→∃=1u(A[u]∧∀z(A[z]→ uPz))
T󸀠3b: ∃=NzA[z]→∃=1u(A[u]∧∀z(A[z]→ zPu))
And we have the following definitions:
D󸀠2a: νxA[x] := ιu(A[u]∧∀z(A[z]→ uPz))
D󸀠2b: σxA[x] := ιu(A[u]∧∀z(A[z]→ zPu))
νxA[x] is the mereological nucleus of the natural numbers that satisfy the pred-
icate A[u], in other words: νxA[x] is the smallest natural number that satisfies
A[u]; σxA[x] is the mereological sum of the natural numbers that satisfy the
predicate A[u], in other words: σxA[x] is the largest natural number that satisfies
A[u] (obviously, the mereological sum of natural numbers is not the arithmetical
sum of them). An expression of the form νxA[x] is not guaranteed to have, for just
any predicate A[x], a referent that conforms to its meaning; it is guaranteed to
have such a referent only for predicates A[x] for which ∃zA[z] is true (see T󸀠3a).
In turn, an expression of the form σxA[x] is not guaranteed to have, for just any
predicate A[x], a referent that conforms to its meaning; it is guaranteed to have
such a referent only for predicates A[x] for which ∃=NzA[z] is true (see T󸀠3b).
The following important theorems can now be proven, which show that the
mereology of natural numbers is, after all, a mereology for abstract entities in a
manner which is to some extent analogous to the way in which A1–A6 plus A7 is
a mereology for abstract entities. According to these theorems, there is a part of
everything which, at the same time, is the one and only atom; there is no natural
concrete model for such a proposition.
T󸀠4: ∀z(νx(x = x)Pz)
Proof. On the basis of T󸀠3a, D󸀠2a, and the (provable) logical truth ∃x(x = x), we
obtain (using the logic of definite descriptions): ∀z(z = z → νx(x = x)Pz); hence
because of ∀z(z = z): ∀z(νx(x = x)Pz). qed
T󸀠5: ¬∃z(zPνx(x = x)∧ z ̸= νx(x = x))
Proof. If zPνx(x = x), then it follows because of T󸀠4 and B3: z = νx(x = x)). qed
T󸀠6: ∀y(¬∃z(zPy ∧ z ̸= y)→ y = νx(x = x))
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Proof. Assume ¬∃z(zPy ∧ z ̸= y); by T󸀠4: νx(x = x)Py; hence νx(x = x) = y, hence
y = νx(x = x). qed
Given the first definition in the following series of definitions,
D󸀠3: 0 := νx(x = x), 1 := succ(0), 2 := succ(1), 3 := succ(2), etc.11
another Peano-axiom is easily provable:
T󸀠7: ¬∃y(succ(y) = 0)
Proof. Suppose succ(y) = 0; hence by D󸀠3: succ(y) = νx(x = x). By T󸀠1, D󸀠3:
yPsucc(y) ∧ y ̸= succ(y). Hence yPνx(x = x) ∧ y ̸= νx(x = x) – contradicting
T󸀠5. qed
But what about the central Peano-axiom, the schema of complete induction? The
schema of complete induction is directly assumed in the present system,
B7: A[0]∧∀x(A[x]→ A[succ(x)])→∀xA[x],
since there appears to be nomore perspicuous way than B7 to describe the aspect
of the world of natural numbers thatB7 is aiming at – except, perhaps, the infinite
axiom ∀x(x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ x = 2 ∨ ... ∨ x = N ∨ ...), taken to cover all and only
expressionsN that are definable in theway indicated inD󸀠3. This axiom, however,
is an infinitely long expression (requiring an infinitistic logic); it is, therefore,
non-standard. With ∀x(x = 0∨ x = 1∨ x = 2∨ ... ∨ x = N ∨ ...) in place, B7 is easily
provable (employing infinitistic logic): Assume A[0] ∧ ∀x(A[x] → A[succ(x)]);
hence (using D󸀠3 ): A[0],A[1],A[2], ...,A[N], ...; hence: ∀x(x = 0→ A[x]), ∀x(x =
1 → A[x]), ∀x(x = 2 → A[x]), ..., ∀x(x = N → A[x]), ...; hence: ∀x(x = 0 ∨ x =
1∨x = 2∨ ...∨x =N∨ ...→A[x]); hence because of∀x(x =0∨x =1∨x =2∨ ...∨x =
N ∨ ...): ∀xA[x].
11 Alternatively one could define: 0 := νx(x = x), 1 := νx(x ̸= 0), 2 := νx(x ̸= 0∧ x ̸= 1), 3 := νx(x ̸=
0∧ x ̸= 1∧ x ̸= 2), etc., and then prove: 1 = succ(0), 2 = succ(1), 3 = succ(2), etc. For example,
“1 = succ(0)” is proven as follows: Since ∀y(y ̸= 0→ νx(x ̸= 0)Py) and succ(0) ̸= 0, we have:
νx(x ̸= 0)Psucc(0); and secondly we have: 0Pνx(x ̸= 0) ∧ 0 ̸= νx(x ̸= 0); and thirdly we have:
¬∃z󸀠(0Pz󸀠∧0 ̸= z󸀠∧z󸀠Psucc(0)∧z󸀠 ̸= succ(0)). Therefore: νx(x ̸=0)= succ(0), hence: 1= succ(0).
